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 Abstract 
In this paper, we analyse the impact of one specific EU social policy measure, the Parental 
Leave Directive. This Directive is based on the first Euro-collective agreement, concluded in 
November 1995 by the ETUC, UNICE and CEEP. Contrary to the rather sceptical 
assessments presented by many observers at the time of its adoption, our in-depth analysis 
of the Directive’s implementation in all 15 member states reveals rather far-reaching effects. 
The Directive induced significant policy reforms in the majority of member states and thus 
facilitated the reconciliation of work and family life for many working parents. These effects 
were not only brought about by compliance with the compulsory minimum standards of the 
Directive, but also by a considerable number of voluntary reforms. We argue that domestic 
party politics and processes of policy learning may explain the occurrence of these 
“unforced” changes, which have hitherto received little attention by Europeanisation 
scholars. 
Zusammenfassung 
Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Auswirkungen der EU-Elternurlaubs-Richtlinie in den 
Mitgliedstaaten. Diese Richtlinie basiert auf dem ersten europäischen Sozialpartner-
Abkommen, das im November 1995 zwischen EGB, UNICE und CEEP abgeschlossen 
wurde. Im Gegensatz zu den skeptischen Einschätzungen vieler Kommentatoren zeigt 
unsere detaillierte empirische Analyse der Umsetzung in allen 15 Mitgliedstaaten, dass die 
Richtlinie durchaus weitreichende Veränderungen auf der nationalen Ebene hervorbrachte. 
Sie führte zu signifikanten Reformen in der Mehrzahl der Mitgliedstaaten und erleichterte es 
auf diese Weise vielen Eltern, Familie und Berufsleben in Einklang zu bringen. Dieser 
Befund ist nicht nur auf die verbindlichen Mindeststandards der Richtlinie zurückführen, 
sondern auch auf eine erhebliche Anzahl von freiwilligen Reformschritten der 
Mitgliedstaaten. Wir zeigen, dass diese bislang von der Europäisierungsforschung wenig 
beachteten freiwilligen Anpassungen zum Teil durch nationale Parteipolitik und zum Teil 
durch Lernprozesse zu erklären sind. 
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1. Introduction 
In November 1995 for the first time, the main European-level management and labour 
organisations, the ETUC, UNICE and CEEP,
1 concluded a collective agreement at European 
level, relating to parental leave and leave for urgent family reasons. In this paper, we aim to 
assess the policy effect of this EU-level agreement in the member states. What was the 
“value added” given existing domestic policies on parental leave? By the time of its adoption, 
many observers assessed  the (potential) policy impact of the agreement and the ensuing 
Directive rather sceptically. It was argued that the agreed minimum standards were fairly low 
and that the Directive thus would not have a significant i mpact at the national level.
2 
Specialist  journals such as the European Industrial Relations Review (EIRR) highlighted 
above all that the length of parental leave laid down in the Directive (three months) 
represented the shortest leave period available in any of the countries with a statutory right 
to parental leave, i.e. in Greece (EIRR 262: 15). In other words, one had the impression that 
policy changes would only be required in a very small number of countries and that these 
changes would have only a limited impact. 
Our results challenge these g loomy initial assessments, which were presented with very 
good reasons, albeit before the member states had begun to incorporate the Directive into 
domestic law. It is our contention that an in-depth study on the actual implementation of this 
(and any other) Directive in all 15 member states is necessary to obtain a realistic picture of 
its actual policy impact. Only today are we in a position to o ffer such a profound empirical 
overview. We can draw on the results of a collaborative project carried out at the Max Planck 
Institute for the Study of Societies entitled “New Governance and Social Europe: Theory and 
Practice of Minimum Harmonisation and Soft Law in the European Multilevel System” 
(http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/socialeurope).
3 This project studied the implementation of 
the main EU Directives of the 1990s concerning labour law (on the subjects of written 
employment contracts, working time, protection of young workers, protection of pregnant 
workers, part-time work, and also on parental leave) from a comparative perspective in all 15 
EU member states. 
In theoretical terms, our paper follows the analytical perspective of the growing literature on 
“Europeanisation” which seeks to illuminate the effects of European policy-making and 
                                                 
1  The European Trade Union Confederation, the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe, 
and the European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation. 
2  See, for example, Keller/Sörries (1997), Streeck (1998). 
3  Parts of the empirical data presented in this paper were gathered by our two collaborators Simone Leiber and 
Miriam Hartlapp. For further details on Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland and the UK see the forthcoming 
dissertation by Oliver Treib (2004), on Greece, Spain, Portugal, France, and Belgium the forthcoming 
dissertation by Miriam Hartlapp (2004), and on Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Luxembourg and Italy see 
the forthcoming dissertation by Simone Leiber (2004). For a comprehensive comparison across all 15 countries 
and all six Directives studied, see our forthcoming book (Falkner et al. 2004). 2 — Oliver Treib/Gerda Falkner / The First EU Social Partner Agreement in Practice — I H S 
 
institution-building on political programmes, structures, and processes at the domestic level 
(see e.g. Börzel/Risse 2000; Falkner 2000; Green Cowles et al. 2001; Goetz/Hix 2001; 
Héritier 2001b; Knill 2001; Schmidt 2002; Börzel 2002). Our focus here clearly lies on policy 
effects. But how do we conceptualise them? Large parts of the Europeanisation literature 
have hitherto focused heavily on the “goodness of fit” b etween European demands and 
national traditions. According to this view, a significant “misfit” is a necessary condition for 
domestic change, while several “mediating factors”, such as supportive (or opposing) 
domestic actor constellations, then determine the actual outcome  (in particular, see 
Börzel/Risse 2000; Risse et al. 2001). 
We partly share this view and argue that the compulsory reform requirements of the Parental 
Leave Directive, backed up by the legal force of European law, indeed a ccount for an 
important part of the national reforms triggered by the Directive. In our view, however, this 
only tells part of the story. First, we observed quite a number of cases where domestic 
governments voluntarily exceeded the minimum standards of the Directive, e.g. by creating 
schemes that offer longer leave periods than required. Second, the Directive also contained 
a number of non-binding soft-law provisions, and our empirical analysis reveals that a 
number of governments also took on board some of these recommendations. The most far-
reaching changes, therefore, were brought about in countries where the Directive both 
demanded significant adaptations and triggered additional domestic reform initiatives that 
reinforced its policy thrust, i.e. by a combination of obligatory and voluntary reforms. In sum, 
our comparative empirical case studies suggest that the impact of the Directive was much 
larger than initially expected. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we will briefly sketch the process that 
led to the adoption of the Parental Leave Directive at the European level and provide an 
overview of its provisions (2). Then, we will turn to the compulsory part of the observed 
adaptations, that is, the effects brought about by compliance with the binding standards of 
the Directive (3). Next, we will look at the surprisingly numerous voluntary reforms enacted 
by d omestic governments as a reaction to the Directive (4). After having summed up the 
overall impact of the Directive (5), we will conclude by discussing the lessons to be drawn 
from our findings with a view to both Europeanisation research and the transformation of the 
welfare state to cover new social risks (6). I H S — Oliver Treib/Gerda Falkner / The First EU Social Partner Agreement in Practice — 3 
2. The Directive’s Content 
The first Commission proposal for a Directive on parental leave and leave for family reasons 
dates back as early as 1983 (COM [83] 686 final). As a result of opposition by the UK and a 
number of other member states, however, unanimous agreement on the draft was 
impossible. Surprisingly, it was the Belgian Council presidency that brought the Directive 
back on the agenda in 1993. However, fruitless negotiations continued u ntil autumn 1994. 
Despite consensus among eleven delegations in the last relevant Council debate on 22 
September 1994, adoption of the proposal was still not possible due to a British veto (for 
details on the negotiations, see e.g. Falkner 1998). 
This was the ideal situation for an application of the Maastricht Social Agreement, which by 
then had already been in force for almost a year. It excluded the UK from the social policy 
measures adopted by the other (then) eleven member states and allowed for the adoption of 
Euro-collective agreements between the major interest groups of employers and trade 
unions that could be transformed into binding Community law by the Council of Ministers (for 
details on the Social Agreement, see Falkner 1998). Hence, consultation o f labour and 
management on the issue of “reconciliation of professional and family life” was instigated by 
the Commission on 22 February 1995. The three major cross-sectoral federations UNICE, 
CEEP, and ETUC were keen to show that the Euro-corporatist procedures of the Maastricht 
Treaty could actually be put into practice. The collective negotiations were successfully 
concluded long before the five-month deadline, on 6 November 1995 (Agence Europe 8 
November 1995: 15). With a view to i mplementation, the ETUC, UNICE, and CEEP 
requested that the Commission submit their framework agreement to the Council for a 
decision that would make the requirements binding in all the member states of the Union 
with the exception of the UK. The Council Directive was indeed adopted on June 3, 1996.
4 
The general aim of the framework agreement (and hence the Directive) is, according to the 
preamble preceding the main text, “to set out minimum requirements on parental leave and 
time off from work on grounds of force majeure, as an important means of reconciling work 
and family life and promoting equal opportunities and treatment between men and women.” 
The purpose of the agreement is therefore to enable working parents to take a certain 
amount of time off from work to take care of  their children. In this context, particular 
                                                 
4  Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP 
and ETUC, Official Journal L 145, 19/06/1996, pp. 4-9. Since the Conservative British government had secured 
an opt-out from the European Treaty’s social chapter at the Maastricht summit, the UK was initially not covered 
by the Directive. Tony Blair’s Labour government, which had assumed power in May 1997, signed up to the 
social chapter and declared its willingness to implement the Directives that had been enacted during the UK’s 
opt-out (EIRR, 282: 2; EIRR 284: 2). As a consequence, the UK also had to implement the Directive, the only 
difference being that its transposition deadline was later than the one applying to the other member states. 4 — Oliver Treib/Gerda Falkner / The First EU Social Partner Agreement in Practice — I H S 
 
emphasis is put on enabling and encouraging men to take on a greater share of childcare 
responsibilities. 
The compulsory minimum standards of the Directive thus encompass seven provisions: (1) 
workers must be granted the right to at least three months parental leave; (2) this entitlement 
is to be an individual right of both male and female workers; (3) parental leave not only has 
to be provided for parents with children by birth, but also to those who have adopted a child; 
(4) workers may not be dismissed on the grounds of exercising their right to parental leave; 
(5) after the leave, workers must be able to return to the same, or, if that is not possible, to 
an equivalent or similar job; (6) rights acquired by workers before the beginning of parental 
leave are to be maintained as they stand until the end of the leave period and have to apply 
again thereafter; and, finally, (7) workers have to be granted the right to force majeure leave, 
i.e. a certain amount of time off from work for unforeseeable reasons arising from a family
5 
emergency making their immediate presence indispensable. 
These binding provisions notwithstanding, establishing the access conditions and modalities 
for applying the right to parental leave and leave for urgent family reasons is left to the 
national governments and social partners. Hence, the Directive includes a number of 
exemptions and derogations from the above-mentioned standards. First, the entitlement to 
parental leave may be made subject to workers having completed a certain period of work or 
length of service, which, however, may not exceed one year. Furthermore, a worker planning 
to take parental leave may be required to notify his or her employer of the dates at which the 
period of leave is to start and finish. It is up to the member states to decide upon the length 
of the notice period. Moreover, employers may be allowed to postpone the granting of 
parental leave for “justifiable reasons related to the operation of the undertaking” (Clause 
2.3.d of the framework agreement). In addition, member states can establish special 
parental-leave arrangements for small undertakings. Finally, the conditions of access and 
detailed rules for applying parental leave may be adjusted to the special circumstances of 
adoption. 
Further to these binding standards and derogation possibilities, the Directive contains no 
less than nine non-binding soft law provisions. Hence, the Directive recommends (1) that the 
entitlement to parental leave should not be transferable between the parents, thereby 
increasing the incentives for men to take the leave; (2) that workers should continue to be 
entitled to social security benefits during parental leave, (3) in particular to health care 
benefits; (4) that parents ought to be able to take parental leave until the child has reached 
the age of eight; (5) that parental leave should not only be granted on a full-time basis, but 
                                                 
5  The Directive does not define the term “family”. This is explicitly left to the member states (Ministerrat 1996). It is 
crucial to note, however, that by using this term, force majeure leave cannot be restricted solely to sickness or 
accidents of children, but must at least  cover unforeseeable emergencies of spouses, too (for a similar 
interpretation, see Schmidt 1997: 122). I H S — Oliver Treib/Gerda Falkner / The First EU Social Partner Agreement in Practice — 5 
also part-time, (6) in a piecemeal way, (7) or in the form of a time-credit system; (8) that men 
should be particularly encouraged to take parental leave in order to assume an equal share 
of family responsibilities, e.g. by measures such as awareness programmes; and (9) that the 
social partners at the national level ought to play a special role in the implementation and 
application of the European framework agreement. 
The large amount of non-binding recommendations, relating to important features of the 
envisaged leave schemes, such as social security coverage during parental leave, flexible 
forms of making use of the leave, or the time up to which the leave can be taken, seems to 
be due to the fact that trade unions and employers in the collective negotiations at the 
European level could not agree on definite standards on these issues. Hence, they chose 
devolution to the national implementation stage as a compromise strategy. 
3.  Compulsory Reforms Imposed on the Member 
States 
What were the effects of these provisions at the domestic level? The first useful step to 
answer this question is establishing the amount of changes the Directive  obliged member 
states to accomplish. What was the difference between the binding standards of the 
Directive and the existing policies at the national level? Given the largely sceptical 
assessment of the Directive after its adoption, it might come as a surprise that our in-depth 
analysis of the Directive’s compulsory reform implications reveals that some sort of 
adaptational pressure was created in all 15 member states. However, the amount of “hard” 
policy misfit varies widely among different countries. 
Four countries did not have any generally-binding legal provisions on parental leave when 
the Directive was adopted: For Ireland, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom, the Directive 
really meant a complete policy innovation in the sense that employees for the first time were 
given the right to take parental leave. Belgium also had no statutory parental-leave scheme 
covering all employees, but the practical relevance of this considerable legal misfit was 
softened by the fact that parental leave was already established in the public sector and that 
additionally, a scheme of career breaks was in operation. Many private-sector employees 
used this scheme as a substitute for parental leave. It offered all workers in the private sector 
the opportunity to take time off for three to twelve months while receiving part of their 
monthly salary and being entitled to return to their job afterwards. However, the right to take 
such an  interruption  de carrière required the employer’s agreement as well as the 6 — Oliver Treib/Gerda Falkner / The First EU Social Partner Agreement in Practice — I H S 
 
replacement of the person taking leave by an unemployed jobseeker.
6 Hence, the Directive 
still demanded significant qualitative adaptations to the status quo. 
The remaining member states had parental leave systems in place. At first sight, these 
systems were all more generous than required by the Directive. All of these eleven countries 
provided for longer leave periods than the Directive’s three months (see Table 1). At the 
lower end of the spectrum was Greece with 3.5 months of leave, followed by Denmark, Italy, 
the Netherlands, and Portugal with six months. The longest full-time leave periods could be 
found in France and Germany (three years), while employees in Finland and Sweden were 
allowed to take very long periods of part-time leave (until the child had reached the age of 
seven or eight years, respectively) in addition to the initial periods of full-time leave which 
amounted to eight months in Finland and 18 months in Sweden. 
Furthermore, eight member states provided some sort of payment during parental leave. The 
most generous payment schemes were in force in Sweden and Finland. Swedish employees 
were entitled to 80 per cent of their previous salary, payable by the state, for the first twelve 
months and to a lower flat-rate benefit for a further six months. In Finland, the first six 
months of leave were financed by the state at the level of about 70 per cent of the previous 
salary, while a lower flat-rate benefit was paid until the child was three years old. In 
Denmark, employees who took parental leave were entitled to state allowance amounting to 
60 per cent of unemployment benefit, and in Italy, they received 30 per cent of their previous 
salary. In Austria, Belgium, Germany, and France, rather low flat-rate benefits were awarded 
to leave-takers, ranging from about 300 to 500 Euro per month. 
                                                 
6  Originally, only SMEs were excluded from the replacement duty, since one of the main reasons for introducing 
this scheme in the first place was the employment effect. Meanwhile, the duty to replace persons taking time off 
under the scheme has been repealed for all undertakings by a reform that came into force on 1 January 2002. I H S — Oliver Treib/Gerda Falkner / The First EU Social Partner Agreement in Practice — 7 
Table 1: Domestic Parental-Leave Schemes Prior to the Directive 
Country  Length of leave  Payment  Restrictions on take-up 
Austria  24 months full-time, 48 
months part-time leave 
low flat-rate benefit  primarily available to 
women; single-income 
couples excluded 
Belgium  12 months full-time (career 
break scheme) 
low flat-rate benefit  consent of employer 
necessary 
Denmark  6 months if taken before 
child’s first birthday, 
otherwise 3 months 
60 per cent of ordinary 
unemployment benefit 
– 
Finland  8 months full-time plus part-
time leave until child is 
seven years old 
70 per cent of previous 
salary during first six 
months and lower flat-rate 
benefit until child is three 
years old 
– 
France  36 months  low flat-rate benefit  – 
Germany  36 months  low flat-rate benefit 
payable for up to two 
years 
single-income couples 
excluded 
Greece  3.5 months  –  employees working in 
SMEs and single-income 
couples excluded 
Ireland  –  –  – 
Italy  6 months  30 per cent of previous 
salary 
primarily available to 
women 
Luxembourg  –  –  – 
Netherlands  6 months (only possible on 
part-time basis) 
–  part-time workers with less 
than 20 hours weekly 
working time excluded 
Portugal  6 months (prolongation of 
up to 24 months possible) 
–  single-income couples 
excluded 
Spain  12 months (prolongation of 
up to 36 months possible) 
–  – 
Sweden  18 months full-time leave 
plus part-time leave until 
child is 8 years old 
80 per cent of previous 
salary during first year; 
lower flat-rate benefit for a 
further six months 
– 
United 
Kingdom 
–  –  – 
 8 — Oliver Treib/Gerda Falkner / The First EU Social Partner Agreement in Practice — I H S 
 
What is overlooked by an exclusive perspective on the length of, and payment during, 
parental leave is that in a considerable number of countries, this leave was not an individual 
right of male and female workers alike. In these countries, the Directive hence demanded the 
introduction of qualitative improvements to the existing schemes. In  Austria and  Italy, the 
parental leave regulations were mainly focused on women, whereas fathers were entitled to 
take the leave only if the mother refrained from using her right. In contrast, the Directive 
required the entitlement to parental leave to apply equally to women and men. Less 
significantly, the Austrian, German, Greek, and Portuguese systems excluded single-income 
families, that is, the typical male breadwinner could not take parental leave if his partner was 
not employed but e.g. worked at home as a housewife, or studied. Meanwhile, almost all of 
these shortcomings have been removed as a reaction to the Directive.
7 
Moreover, two countries completely debarred further important categories of the workforce 
from being covered by the scheme. In  Greece, all workers in small and medium-sized 
enterprises with less than 50 employees had no entitlement to parental leave. As a reaction 
to the Directive, this exclusion was repealed. In the Netherlands, employees could not take 
full-time leave to take care of a child, but were only entitled to reduce their weekly working 
time to 20 hours. While it would not have been contrary to the Directive to provide for part-
time leave only, the obvious downside of the pre-existing Dutch parental leave scheme was 
that employees whose weekly working time was below 20 hours were not entitled to parental 
leave at all (Interview NL4: 60–76). Hence, the Dutch preoccupation with part-time leave led 
to the paradoxical situation that many part-timers were excluded from the right to parental 
leave. However, when the Directive was adopted, a national review process of the existing 
legislation was already under way, and the reform proposals issued by the government as a 
result of that review already provided for an extension of the parental leave scheme to all 
employees (Clauwaert/Harger 2000: 68). As a result of this parallel domestic reform process, 
the incorporation of the Directive into domestic law did not pose any major problems. 
Moreover, the majority of member states needed to change their legislation in regard to force 
majeure leave. While Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the UK did not have generally 
binding legal  rules on time off from work due to urgent family reasons,
8 Finland, France, 
Greece, Spain, and Sweden had to adapt their existing regulations, mostly by including 
emergencies relating to family members other than children in the scope of the leave. 
Hence, certain improvements were also brought about in this area. 
                                                 
7  At the time of writing, the Greek legislation still excludes single-income couples, while the Austrian scheme still 
includes a small advantage for the mother. 
8  In Denmark, force majeure leave was granted to many employees on the basis of collective agreements, which 
reduces the policy impact of this lack of generally binding legislation considerably. However, adaptation to the 
Directive met with specific difficulties since the adoption of generally binding legislation in this area clashed with 
the Danish tradition of autonomous social partnership. As the focus of this paper lies on the policy impact of the 
Directive, we will not discuss this very interesting effect here. For more details, see Falkner/Leiber (2004). I H S — Oliver Treib/Gerda Falkner / The First EU Social Partner Agreement in Practice — 9 
In sum, there is not one country whose rules and regulations were already completely in line 
with the Directive. Seven member states had to cope with low degrees of policy misfit, five 
with medium-scale policy misfit, and three countries were confronted with high degrees of 
policy misfit (see figure 1). 
Figure 1: Compulsory Policy Misfit in 15 Member States 
low degree ofi
policy misfiti
medium degree ofi
policy misfiti
high degree ofi
policy misfiti
     D       DK       E         F       FIN       P        S         A        B        GR       I         NL      IRL     LUX    UK 
 
4. Voluntary Fortification of the Directive’s Thrust 
Besides these already considerable domestic reforms caused by the compulsory standards 
of the Parental Leave Directive, we have observed a number of cases where d omestic 
governments even went significantly beyond the European minimum requirements. On the 
one hand, this concerned voluntary reforms that exceeded the binding European standards 
(surpassing adaptation). On the other hand, quite a number of member states reflected some 
of the soft-law provisions laid down in the Directive. 
With regard to soft-law effects, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and the UK provided 
for the entitlement to parental leave to be non-transferable. It seems that this recommen-
dation was only implemented by countries that introduced completely new schemes. This 
was even true for Portugal. Although an entitlement to up to two years “special leave” had 
already existed before, the government introduced a new parental leave scheme in addition 
to the existing system. Interestingly, the new scheme was made non-transferable, whereas 
the “special leave” system had been transferable. Apparently, this was done because 
Portuguese officials were convinced that this provision of the Directive was compulsory 
rather than optional (Interview P1: 1895–1902). 10 — Oliver Treib/Gerda Falkner / The First EU Social Partner Agreement in Practice — I H S 
 
The recommendation that taking leave should be possible until the child’s eight birthday was 
reflected in the legislation of four countries. Austria and Germany retained their general age 
limits but provided for the possibility to take part of the leave until the child is seven (Austria) 
or eight years of age (Germany). In Italy, the age limit was raised from three to nine. In the 
Netherlands, the government originally wanted to raise the age threshold from four to six, but 
the trade unions pushed to let parents take the leave until the child has reached the age of 
eight. 
With regard to flexible forms of take-up, Germany adopted a rather far-reaching system that 
gives parents working in companies with more than 30 employees the legal right to work 
part-time during parental leave. Portugal went even further and guaranteed all employees a 
legal right to work part-time during parental leave (Interview P9: 792–796). Belgium endowed 
mothers and fathers working in companies with more than ten employees with a legal right to 
part-time leave. In addition, leave can also be taken in a piecemeal way and on the basis of 
a time-credit system provided that the employer agrees (Clauwaert/Harger 2000: 21). Finally, 
the already-mentioned possibility introduced in Austria and Germany to postpone part of the 
leave implies that the leave also can b e taken in a piecemeal way. Furthermore, both 
countries created the possibility for mothers and f athers to take parts of the whole leave 
period alternately. 
The provision that men should be encouraged to take an equal share of their family 
responsibilities also had a substantial impact in some countries. In Germany, the measures 
relating to simultaneous leave and part-time working during parental leave were explicitly 
meant to make parental leave more attractive for men. In addition, the introduction of the 
revised parental leave act was accompanied by a public campaign sponsored by the 
Department of Family Affairs, which aimed to encourage men to become more involved in 
childcare. A similar campaign was also carried out in Spain but was not supplemented with 
specific legislative measures. In Portugal, the introduction of a right to part-time leave aimed 
to make parental leave for men more attractive. On top of that, the government created a 
specific incentive for fathers to avail themselves of their right to parental leave: while leave 
normally is unpaid, the first 15 days of the leave taken by a male employee are paid by the 
state. Ministry officials considered this measure to be a direct r eaction to the Directive 
(Interview P1: 1752–1784, 2164–2149). Finally, Italy provided fathers with the right to an 
extra month of leave if they go on parental leave for at least three months. 
Besides these soft-law effects, we have also found a number of cases where national 
governments were induced to introduce reforms surpassing the Directive’s minimum 
standards without reflecting any particular soft-law provisions. The most significant example 
of this pattern was Luxembourg, where the newly-created statutory scheme provides for six 
instead of three months parental leave which is, moreover, generously paid by the state and 
even pertains to persons usually not considered employees, i.e. civil servants and the self-
employed. Belgium also introduced paid parental leave financed by the state, although this I H S — Oliver Treib/Gerda Falkner / The First EU Social Partner Agreement in Practice — 11 
special paid leave may be refused by employers in small establishments with less than ten 
employees. Italy voluntarily extended the length of the leave from six to ten months and 
granted self-employed women tax relief if they arranged to be replaced by another person. 
More minor instances of this kind of over-implementation could be observed in  Austria 
(notice periods were reduced and employees were given the right to be informed about 
important events in their company during parental leave), Germany (possibility for parents to 
take parental leave simultaneously),  Ireland (force majeure leave has to be paid by the 
employer), and  Portugal (the right to take “parental” leave was partly extended to 
grandparents, who are now entitled to 30 days special grandparents leave). 
In sum, we could observe a surprisingly large number of voluntary reforms fortifying the 
thrust of the Directive (see Table 2). Significant instances of this pattern were to be found in 
five member states (Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg). A further four 
countries went beyond the compulsory minimum level of the Directive in some minor aspects 
(Spain, Austria, the Netherlands, and Ireland). 
Table 2: Compulsory and Voluntary Reforms Caused by the Parental Leave Directive 
Degree of compulsory policy changes required by the Directive 
 
low  medium  high 
none  Denmark, France, 
Finland, Sweden 
Greece   
minor  Spain  Austria, Netherlands  Ireland, United 
Kingdom 
Voluntary 
fortification 
of the 
Directive’s 
thrust 
significant  Germany, Portugal  Belgium, Italy  Luxembourg 
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5. An Overview of the Total Policy Effects 
In order to categorise the observed domestic policy effects of the Parental Leave Directive, 
we use a fourfold
9 typology, modifying a number of categorisations suggested in the 
literature (Héritier 2001a: 54; Radaelli 2001: 119–120; Börzel 2004). The first category is no 
or only negligible effect, which means that there was no impact at all or that the effect was 
only very small. Four countries may be subsumed under this heading: Denmark, Finland, 
France, and Sweden (see Table 3). All of these countries only had to adapt parts of their 
existing policies on leave for urgent family reasons and did not enact any further voluntary 
reforms in the context of implementing the Directive. The lack of reactions to the soft-law 
provisions in these countries may be explained by the fact that especially in Finland and 
Sweden, many of the recommendations had already been fulfilled (e.g. the possibility to take 
part-time leave). 
Table 3: Overall Policy Effects of the Parental Leave Directive 
No or Only Negligible 
Effect 
Reinforced Policy  Patchwork Addition  Paradigmatic 
Change 
Denmark, France, 
Finland, Sweden 
Spain  Austria Germany, 
Greece, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal 
Belgium, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, United 
Kingdom 
 
The second category is reinforced policy, denoting cases where the existing policies were 
neither transformed fundamentally nor supplemented with qualitatively new elements. 
Instead, the old policy remained in place and similar elements were added. This applies only 
to Spain, where the Directive brought about a more explicit protection of leave-takers from 
dismissal as well as a small (voluntary) adaptation of the rules on force majeure leave. 
Next is  patchwork addition. Here, the fundamentals of the existing system remained 
unchanged, but qualitatively new elements were added. This pattern could be observed in 
Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal. In Austria, Greece, and the 
Netherlands, this effect was brought about by the compulsory requirements of the Directive, 
that is, by the need to extend the existing scheme to all part-time workers (Netherlands), to 
workers in SMEs and to single-income families (Greece), and to f athers as well as single-
                                                 
9  In principle, the typology includes five categories. But the fifth category, weakened policy, did not play a role in 
the present cases. Theoretically, however, it is well possible that a European policy undermines the existing 
domestic system without completely replacing it and without adding qualitatively new elements. I H S — Oliver Treib/Gerda Falkner / The First EU Social Partner Agreement in Practice — 13 
income families (Austria). In the remaining three countries, a mixture of compulsory and 
voluntary reforms accounted for the outcome. Germany was forced to extend the right to 
take parental leave to single-income couples, but also took up a number of the non-binding 
recommendations of the Directive. In this way, the German government introduced 
qualitatively new policy elements, in particular the l egal right to work part-time during 
parental leave. In Portugal, the amount of compulsory adaptation requirements was also 
rather low, but like in Germany, the government reacted in a rather extensive way to the soft-
law provisions. The newly created parental leave scheme was made non-transferable, 
employees were offered a legal right to part-time work during parental leave, and the 
government created specific incentive measures for men to take parental leave. In Italy, 
considerable compulsory reforms (the need to entitle fathers to parental leave on an equal 
footing) were combined with significant voluntary ones (incentive measures for men, longer 
leave period, and tax relief for self-employed). 
The fourth category is  paradigmatic change, including both the complete reversal of an 
existing policy and the creation of an entirely new policy from scratch. In this group, we have 
Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the UK. Ireland and the UK were forced to create 
completely new parental leave systems, but did not enact any significant voluntary reforms. 
Belgium already had to qualitatively transform its existing system of career breaks. But the 
government supplemented this step by considerable voluntary r eforms (higher payment 
during parental leave, right to work part-time), thereby again creating something qualitatively 
new. Luxembourg, finally, complemented the creation of a completely new system of parental 
leave with significant voluntary steps, especially by offering six instead of three months leave 
and by providing for generous payment during the leave. 
In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the Directive’s impact, we should not only look 
at the enacted  legal reforms, but also at the  practical outcomes in the member states. 
Considering actual take-up rates of parental leave, the limits of the Directive become evident. 
On the basis of the few data available, apparently the highest take-up rates are to be found 
in countries where parental leave is paid, such as in Sweden, Finland, Germany, or Austria 
(Bruning/Plantenga 1999: 200–203). In countries offering unpaid leave only, take-up rates 
are much lower (EIRR 262: 15). This is particularly severe in countries like Greece and 
Portugal where average wages are very low so that employees cannot afford to go on leave 
without any supplementary financial aid. Since the Directive did not require the provision of 
payment during parental leave, no decisive improvements to this situation have been 
achieved. 
A look at the countries in which parental leave was newly introduced confirms this 
impression. In Ireland, where a rather minimalist scheme without any payment for parental 
leave is in operation, take-up rates are rather low. Research commissioned by the 
government revealed that only about 20 per cent of eligible employees actually made use of 
their entitlement in 2001  (DJELR 2002: 119). No data is available so far for the UK but it is 14 — Oliver Treib/Gerda Falkner / The First EU Social Partner Agreement in Practice — I H S 
 
very likely that they would point in a similar direction. In contrast, much higher take-up rates 
have been reported from Luxembourg, where the government chose to considerably over-
implement the Directive by providing generous state benefits for workers on parental leave. 
Hence, positive  outcomes in terms of take-up rates may only be observed where national 
governments considerably improved on the minimum standards of the Directive. 
If we turn our attention to  gender disparities among leave-takers, women still make up the 
vast majority of leave-takers in almost all countries. The likeliness of fathers to take parental 
leave appears to be lowest if entitlements to parental leave are transferable b etween the 
parents and if payment is low or non-existent. In Germany or Austria, for e xample, only 
between one and two per cent of leave-takers are men  (Bruning/Plantenga 1999: 200; 
Vascovics/Rost 1999). Where parental leave is generously paid, ideally on an earnings-
related basis, take-up rates of fathers are higher. The most striking example in this respect is 
Sweden, where parents receive 80 per cent of their previous earnings during the largest part 
of their leave. Here, about 50 per cent of all fathers take some period of parental leave, even 
though women still take much longer periods of leave (Bruning/Plantenga 1999: 200). 
Even though there is no indication that the Directive led to a fundamental overhaul of this 
situation, it did bring about some small improvements. First of all, the Directive considerably 
strengthened the legal rights of men to take parental leave. In countries where men had 
previously been legally disadvantaged in their access to the leave schemes, the Directive 
has removed one of the most obvious stumbling blocks for increased male take-up rates.  
Moreover, the Directive has stimulated reforms in some countries, which might turn out to 
have positive effects on the share of male workers in childcare. Provisions on the non-
transferability of parental leave entitlements and on part-time or flexible forms of take-up, 
albeit only non-binding in character, did have an effect in some countries. Belgium, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, and the UK made entitlement to their new leave schemes non-transferable, 
while Portugal established a second non-transferable scheme along the existing rules. 
Indeed, the share of men who take parental leave is comparatively high in some of these 
countries. Available data reveals that about 15 per cent of all leave-takers are men in 
Belgium (Clauwaert/Harger 2000: 24). In Ireland, this ratio is even 16 per cent (DJELR 2002: 
120). Finally, a number of other voluntary reforms likely to have a positive effect on male 
take-up rates, such as the considerable facilitation of flexible leave forms, were implemented 
in some countries. 
However, it is still too soon to assess the practical effects of these steps. In this context, we 
should not forget that the low rate of fathers on parental leave is to a large part the result of 
deeply entrenched role definitions in society which, insofar as they are malleable by political 
intervention at all, will only change through a gradual process whose extent will have to be 
measured in decades rather than in months or years. I H S — Oliver Treib/Gerda Falkner / The First EU Social Partner Agreement in Practice — 15 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have looked at the impact of the first EU-level social partner agreement, on 
parental leave and leave for urgent family reasons. Contrary to the rather sceptical initial 
assessments, our in-depth analysis of the Parental Leave Directive’s implementation in all 15 
member states revealed surprisingly far-reaching effects. By way of both compulsory 
adaptations and voluntary reforms, the D irective induced significant policy reforms in the 
majority of member states and thus considerably facilitated the reconciliation of work and 
family life for many working parents. 
Given the fact that the Directive did not force member states to introduce paid parental leave 
and that many useful provisions were of a non-binding nature, the most far-reaching effects 
in terms of actual take-up rates and in terms of the share of men who take parental leave 
were produced in those countries where the required adaptations were supplemented by 
voluntary ones triggered by the Directive. 
These voluntary effects in particular have hitherto received little attention. Many 
Europeanisation scholars have been preoccupied with “misfits” or “mismatches” between 
European demands and domestic structures and policies. In this field of literature, therefore, 
the “soft” impact of European recommendations has so far played only a minor role.
10 It was 
only recently that the invention and proliferation of the “open method of co-ordination” has 
increased the interest in non-compulsory reforms triggered by the EU  (Héritier 2001c; 
Hodson/Maher 2001; de la Porte/Pochet 2002; Mosher/Trubek 2003). Our results suggest 
that the possibility of such voluntary adaptations should be taken into account by 
Europeanisation researchers much more systematically than has so far been the case. 
But how can we explain these voluntary reforms? As is well known, their realisation is not 
backed by the binding force of European law as is the case with “hard” policy standards. 
Theoretically, two explanations seem possible. Scholars following constructivist or 
sociological institutionalist arguments would highlight policy learning and the diffusion of 
ideas as the causal mechanism. More interest-based approaches would point to the policy 
preferences of domestic actors, e.g. to party political interests of governments, as the factor 
that accounts for such voluntary reforms. In this view, soft-law elements would be taken up if 
they fit in with the policy preferences of domestic governments. Our empirical results seem 
to support both arguments to some extent. 
The role of party politics is certainly important in explaining the observed cases of voluntary 
adaptation. Among the five countries in which significant forms of surpassing implementation 
                                                 
10  One major exception is Christoph Knill’s and Dirk Lehmkuhl’s (1999) concept of “framing integration” which 
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occurred, three were governed by centre-left governments when the D irective was 
implemented. In Germany, a coalition between the social democrats and the green party was 
in power, Portugal was governed by the socialist party, and the Italian reform was enacted by 
a coalition government consisting of seven centre-left parties. This result indeed suggests 
that party politics matters here. As has been h ypothesised by Armingeon and Bonoli, the 
reconciliation of work and family life as one of the main “new social risk” policies seems to be 
supported more by centre-left parties than by Christian democratic, conservative, or liberal 
parties (Armingeon/Bonoli 2003). 
This was particularly obvious in the German case, where the previous Christian 
democratic/liberal government was already opposed to the 1983 draft Directive. After a less 
far-reaching version of the Directive had been adopted in 1996, the same coalition 
government refused to fulfil the compulsory reform requirements (including single-income 
couples into the scope of the parental leave scheme) since the equal treatment impetus of 
the Directive ran counter to the conservative family policy of the Christian democratic 
coalition partner (Interview D9: 143–150). Only the “Red-Green” government, which had 
assumed power in 1998, complied with the Directive and, additionally, took on board many of 
the soft-law provisions (see Treib 2003 for more details). 
However, the picture becomes more complicated if we look at the remaining two countries. 
The significant voluntary reforms to be found in Belgium and Luxembourg were created by 
grand coalitions between Christian democratic and social democratic parties. Both of these 
coalitions, moreover, w ere led by the larger Christian democratic coalition partners and in 
both countries, the responsible ministry was headed by a Christian democrat. This finding 
suggests that not all Christian democratic or conservative parties are necessarily opposed to 
policies covering the reconciliation of work and family life.
11 
At this point, policy learning comes into play. Especially in the case of Luxembourg, part of 
the swift adaptation as well as of the wide-ranging over-implementation seems to be due to 
the government’s realisation of being a European laggard with regard to parental leave and 
thus wanting to catch up with the others. The other part of the Luxembourg story, however, 
again fits better to an interest-based model. In Luxembourg, parental leave was seen as an 
opportunity to fight unemployment. It was hoped that the need for temporary replacements 
would help unemployed persons back into the labour market. Seen from this labour-market 
perspective, therefore, it was important to create a scheme with generous payment that 
would be used by many working parents so that enough replacements would be needed. 
                                                 
11  This is also corroborated by another case. In Ireland, all parties supported the introduction of parental leave, 
including the two  large conservative parties Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. The Directive therefore was 
implemented rather swiftly by a government consisting of Fianna Fáil and the liberal Progressive Democrats. I H S — Oliver Treib/Gerda Falkner / The First EU Social Partner Agreement in Practice — 17 
Since it is very difficult in methodological terms to clearly discern such learning processes, 
however, we do not want to rule out the possibility that some of the other i nstances of 
voluntary adaptation were actually caused by policy learning rather than by party politics. At 
any rate, our analysis suggests that European soft law may have an impact at the domestic 
level and that the effect of European policies may be larger than suggested by looking at the 
compulsory standards of Directives only. 18 — Oliver Treib/Gerda Falkner / The First EU Social Partner Agreement in Practice — I H S 
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